IPv6 Security Fundamentals

UK IPv6 Council July 2017

Dr David Holder CEng FIET MIEEE

🖂 david.holder@erion.co.uk


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IPv6 Security Fundamentals

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- Common Misconceptions about IPv6 Security
- IPv6 Threats and Vulnerabilities
- IPv6 Security Features
- The Future for IPv6 Security

Why Does IPv6 Security Matter?



- Dual stack users: 75% of traffic is over IPv6
- Over 16% of users have IPv6 connectivity
- Over 50% of top websites are IPv6 enabled
- Annual doubling of IPv6 users

RIPE Head Office

Please sir can I

ave some more?

IPv6 is 10-15% faster than IPv4

Almost 100% of nodes are IPv6 capable

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IPv6 Security Fundamentals

Common Misconceptions about IPv6 Security

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- IPv6 Threats and Vulnerabilities
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The Top Two Misconceptions

IPv6 is *more* secure than IPv4 ×
 IPv6 is *less* secure than IPv4 ×


• Both are **WRONG**

Assume that comparing IPv4 with IPv6 is meaningful – it isn't

More about why people think this later, but first the truth...

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Today's Reality: IPv6 Dual Stacks





similar vulnerabilities

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Dual stack devices and operating systems

IPv4/IPv6

Network

- Today's operating systems and devices are all dual stack
- IPv6 on by default
- Even IPv4 networks are built on IPv6 dual stacks
- Combined IPv4/IPv6 vulnerability surface

Dual Stack Implications

- Comparing IPv4 and IPv6 security is irrelevant
- Dual stack is everywhere even without deploying IPv6
- IPv6 is already in your network today
- Turning it off is the wrong thing to do
- Combined IPv4/IPv6 vulnerability surface
 - Attackers will choose weakest link
 - DoS possible due to shared resources
 - Complexity more than doubled

IPv4 Legacy Apps
UDP)
IPv4 Stack
<u> </u>
- C.V.

So, secure your network against IPv6 vulnerabilities now (Ideally you should have done this over decade ago)
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The Third Big Misconception

3. IPv6 is IPv4 with longer addresses X

Prefix (64 bits)	Interface ID (64 bits)
------------------	------------------------

- It isn't; many complex & subtle differences from IPv4
- *Even* addresses are very different:
 - New attributes: length, scope and lifetimes
 - Normal for IPv6 interfaces to have multiple addresses
 - **NEW** IPv6 addresses can change over time
- DIFFERENT Multicast is very important in IPv6
 - Large number of methods for assigning interface identifiers

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- DIFFERENT How addresses are used and managed is different
- DIFFERENT Global addresses are normal

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IPv6 Security: The Problems


Complexity

- Lots of changes and new features
- IPv6 is flexible and extendable

Shares resources

- IPv4 and IPv6 share resources
- IPv4 and IPv6 coupling
 - Transition mechanisms
 - Standards evolving over time
 - Presents a moving target
 - Staff competency in IPv6
 - Legacy IPv4 thinking

The IPv6 Vulnerability Surface



IPv6 Threats: Reality Check

IPv6 firewalls/security

Now common and on by default

Common threats

Many vulnerabilities are common to both IPv4 and IPv6

Common attack vectors

Different vulnerabilities often have common attack vectors

Many vulnerabilities are not new

We already have mitigation strategies for many threats

Double standards


IPv6 criticised for things that are ignored in IPv4

Scanning and Reconnaissance



BETTER

- Scanning all addresses in IPv4 is easy
- IPv4 methods impractical for IPv6
 - Number of interface addresses 2⁶⁴ = 18,446,744,073,709,551,616
 - Scan would take 491,351 years on Gigabit Ethernet (no other traffic)
 - However, other more intelligent, forms of reconnaissance are possible




End-to-End Transparency

- IPv6 restores end-to-end connectivity
- Global addresses everywhere: no network address translation

NEW


• IPv6 security relies on *firewalls* instead of *broken connectivity*



IPv6 Extension Headers

NEW


- Extension Headers (EHs) carry options
 - Many are extendable with complex formats and rules



Hop-by-hop Options0Routing Header43Fragment Header44Authentication Header51Encapsulating Security Header50Destination Options60	eader Type	Next Header
Fragment Header44Authentication Header51Encapsulating Security Header50Destination Options60	pp-by-hop Options	0
Authentication Header51Encapsulating Security Header50Destination Options60	outing Header	43
Encapsulating Security Header50Destination Options60	agment Header	44
Destination Options 60	thentication Header	51
	capsulating Security Header	50
	estination Options	60
Mobility Header 135	bility Header	135
No Next Header 59	Next Header	59

IPv6 Extension Header Threats

- IPv6 places options in extension header chain
 - Originally no limit was placed on length of list



NEW

ICMPv6 Threats

■ Internet Control Message Protection Type: 135 (Neighbor solicitor Code: 0 Checksum: 0x0074 [correct] Target: fe80::20c:29ff:feb5

- More complex than ICMPv4
- More essential than ICMPv4
- Merges new and old features
- Requires *new* firewall policies

RFC 4890

- Some messages *must* traverse firewalls
- Cannot secure most messages with IPsec

		Туре	Message Type
	(1	Destination Unreachable
- I	CMPv6 Error	2	Packet Too Big
	Messages	3	Time Exceeded
		4	Parameter Problem
	Dian	128	Echo Request
	Ping -	129	Echo Reply
		130	Multicast Listener Query
M	ulticast (MLD) 🚽	131	Multicast Listener Report
		132	Multicast Listener Done
	SLAAC	133	Router Solicitation
	1	134	Router Advertisement
Neid	ghbor discovery, 🤳	135	Neighbor Solicitation
	DAD, etc	136	Neighbor Advertisement
		137	Redirect Message
		138	Router Renumbering
		139	ICMP Node Information Query
		140	ICMP Node Information Response
		141	Inverse ND Solicitation
		142	Inverse ND Adv Message
Multi	cast (MLDv2)	143	Version 2 Multicast Listener Report
		144	ICMP Home Agent Address Discovery Request
		145	ICMP Home Agent Address Discovery Reply
	Mobile IPv6	146	ICMP Mobile Prefix Solicitation
		147	ICMP Mobile Prefix Advertisement
		148	Certification Path Solicitation Message
		149	Certification Path Advertisement Message
		151	Multicast Router Advertisement
		152	Multicast Router Solicitation
		153	Multicast Router Termination
		154	Mobile IPv6 Fast Handovers FMIPv6
S		155	RPL Control Message
5		156	ILNPv6 Locator Update Message
		157	Duplicate Address Request
	6LowPAN	158	Duplicate Address Confirmation
ec		159	MPL Control Message

Neighbor Discovery (NDP)


Stateless address auto-configuration (SLAAC)[№]

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- Router discovery
- Prefix discovery
- Parameter discovery
- Next-hop determination
- Address resolution **DIFFEREN**
- Neighbor unreachability detection (NUD)
- Duplicate address detection (DAD)

Neighbor Discovery Protocol Threats

- Neighbor Cache poisoning
- Spoofing Duplicate Address Detection (DAD)
- Interfere with Neighbor Unreachability Detection (NUD)
- Rogue router
- Parameter Spoofing
- Bogus on-link prefixes
- Bogus address configuration prefixes
- Disabling routers
- Interfere with on-link determinations
- Forwarding loops
- Interfere with NDP Implementation
- Interfere with NDP router implementation from a remote site
- Replay attacks




NEW

RFC4861 RFC4862 RFC4311 RFC6583

Example: Rogue Router

Attacks: denial of service (DoS) and man-in-the-middle




Example: Remote NDP Attack

RFC 6583


NEW

- IPv6 subnets are large
 - Interface addresses $2^{64} = 18,446,744,073,709,551,616$
- NDP may be vulnerable to DoS attack
 - ND cache may be exhausted
 - Valid ND messages may be lost or they may expire
- Attack can be instigated remotely



Transition Mechanisms Threats

- Large number of mechanisms (~30)
- Complex interactions between IPv4 and IPv6
- Standard in many stacks
- Few have built-in security
- Complex address formats
- Each has many vulnerabilities
- Some can create backdoors




All transition mechanisms are bad, some are necessary, you cannot simply ignore, you may have to use some

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Example 6to4 Threat

Spoofed traffic injected into IPv6 network from IPv4 internet


- IPv4 Source = Spoofed
- IPv4 Destination = 6to4 Relay
- IPv6 Source = Spoofed
- IPv6 Destination = Victim
- 6to4 treats IPv4 internet as single subnet



IPv6 Internet

IPv6 Victim

Teredo Threat Example



IPv6 Address Reputation

- Recording the reputation of all 2¹²⁸ addresses is impossible
- Attackers have a huge number of source addresses to use
- Even recording prefix reputation is problematic

Number of /64s	Number of /48s	Number of /32s
18,446,744,073,709,551,616	281,474,976,710,656	4,294,967,296

- It isn't quite as bad as the above. Only a part of the total address space has been reserved for public addresses. Out of this space only a part has been allocated to RIRs - never mind end users.
- Prefixes may be shared by many innocent parties
 - Particularly difficult for SMTP anti-spam measures (RDNSBL)
 - Bad solutions can create new problems

IPv6 Security Fundamentals

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
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IPv6 Security (IPsec)

- Built into and protects the network layer
- Allows for different security mechanisms and is extendable

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- Two extension headers
 - Authentication Header (AH)
 - Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP)
- Interoperable
- Cryptographically based
- Was mandatory feature in IPv6 stacks
- Identical to IPv4 IPsec
- Cannot solve all security problems



RFC 4301 RFC 4302 RFC 4303 RFC 4305 RFC 4306


Transport and Tunnel Modes

Transport Mode

- Between two hosts
- Rarer in IPv4 due to NAT44
- More common in IPv6?

Tunnel Mode

- Security applied to tunnel
- Between hosts or gateways
- Secures whole IPv6 datagram
- Used to create VPNs
- Common in IPv4 due to NAT44




Privacy Addresses in IPv6

Alternative to modified EUI-64 Interface Identifiers (IIDs)




- Avoids exposing MAC address in IPv6 addresses
- Address is used for *client* connections
- Temporary address is refreshed after a short period of time
- Makes harvesting addresses for future attacks difficult
- Has management implications



Opaque Static Addresses

- Avoids use of MAC address in IID (modified EUI-64)
- Avoids exposing MAC address in IPv6 address
- Generates a predictable IID
- IID does not change with time
- IID is different for each network and prefix



RFC 7217

Cryptographically Generated Addresses (CGA)

- Used to prove the ownership of an IPv6 address
- Binds IPv6 interface ID (IID) to a public key
- Is created from a hash of public key and other parameters
- CGA is verified by calculating the hash and comparing with IID

RFC3972 RFC4581 RFC4982


Does not require public key infrastructure (PKI)

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		8		00		Hash Algorithm		8		000		
Create Co public ke	ey and	~			IPv6 P	refix (64 bits)			CO	GA IID (6	4 bits)	
other para Including			5	-	H	4.	IPv6 addre	ess	0	-	-	
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Secure Neighbor Discovery (SeND)

- Secures some Neighbor Discovery (ND) messages
- Can form part of PKI or use local trust anchor
- Uses Cryptographically Generated Addresses
- Not widely available on all platforms
- Has limitations



Internet Protocol Version 6, Src: fe80::3463:5279:2977:29ba ternet Control Message Protocol v6 ype: Routen Accertisement (134) Checksum: 0x5862 [correct] Cur hop limit: 64 Flags: 0x20 Router lifetime (s): 30 Reachable time (ms): 0 Retrans timer (ms): 0 ICMPv6 Option (Prefix information : 3025::/64) ICMPv6 Option (Source link-layer address : 00:0c:29:4e:25 Type: Source link-layer address (1) Length: 1 (8 bytes) Link-layer address: Vmware_4e:25:00 (00:0c:29:4e:25:00 ICMPv6 Option (CGA) Type: CGA (11) Length: 24 (192 bytes) Pad Length: 1 Reserved CGA: d862adb99efe5b68a9a0e431563d747efe800000000 Padding ICMPv6 Option (Timestamp) Type: Timestamp (13) Length: 2 (16 bytes) Reserved Timestamp: Dec 14, 2016 12:43:05.000000000 GMT ICMPv6 Option (RSA Signature) Type: RSA Signature (12) Length: 19 (152 bytes) Reserved Key Hash: a0828691967292db133b6bb9f3873e93 Digital Signature and Padding

RFC3971

RFC6494 RFC6495

IPv6 LAN Security Features

RA-Guard

Validation and control of RAs

DHCPv6-Shield


Validation and control of DHCPv6

Neighbor Discovery Inspection

Validation of NDP messages

MLD Snooping

- Improves multicast LAN performance
- Can limit certain multicast attacks
- Usually implemented in switches
 - Can be circumvented



Attacks Against Security Features

- RA-Guard, MLD-Snooping, DHCPv6-Shield and Neighbor Discovery Protocol Inspection can be circumvented
- Extension headers make packet inspection difficult

ragment 1	e hidden in sec	Fragment 2	gmen		
IPv6 Frag EH	EHs	IPv6	Frag EH	EHs	ICMPv6 Attack
cent standa	rds address the	ese pro	blems		
			blems		
Constrain the	urds address the use of extension I agmentation of ce	headers			

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The Future of IPv6 Security

IPv6-only networks

- No further need to support IPv4
- No IPv4 vulnerabilities
- No transition mechanisms vulnerabilities
- Make best use of IPv6 security features
- Reduced operational costs

IPv6-only Network IPv6-only devices and operating systems

Conclusions

- IPv4-only networks are historic
- IPv6 should already form a part of your security policy
- IPv6 security introduces many new vulnerabilities and features
- IPv6-only networks will have fewer vulnerabilities
- Legacy IPv4 thinking is a risk; staff IPv6 competency is crucial

Any Questions?

Further Information

Erion IPv6 Training IPv6 Consultancy IPv6 Blog http://www.erion.co.uk http://www.ipv6training.com http://www.ipv6consultancy.com http://www.ipv6consultancy.com/ipv6blog

 IPv6 Training
 IPv6

 25th Sep 2017
 15th Jan 2018

 6th Feb 2018
 6th Feb 2018

Implementing and Securing IPv6 Implementing and Securing IPv6 IPv6 Forensics NEW

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Closed on-site courses available worldwide Many other IPv6 courses and IPv6 security courses available

Profile: David Holder

- CEO and Chief Consultant Erion Ltd
- Author of numerous reports and whitepapers
- Chairman of IPv6 Task Force Scotland
- Regular speaker on IPv6
- Extensive experience of IPv6 spanning over 19 years